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TIlE RICIIT OF RECAPTION OF CHATTELS BY FORCE
The courts appear to be in agreement that a person is
privileged to use force in the recaption of chattels taken from
his immediate possession by force or by fraud, but the amount
of force used must not be excessive.' It is often said, however,
that if the right of possession, is in dispute, force to retake may
not be used, but resort must be made to civil remedies, not to
self-help.2

There is also some disagreement as to the point at

which the amount of force becomes excessive, some courts
holding that the actor is privileged to use as much force as is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the result, provided serious
bodily harm is not threatened.3 The majority of decisions seem
to follow the above rule, but a strong minority hold that the
owner of a chattel may recapture it, whenever and wherever
he can do so, only on condition that no breach of the peace
occurs.
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The purpose of this note is to consider the divergence

of these two views and to suggest considerations affecting the
matter.
The privilege of an owner to retake by force a chattel of
which he had been deprived arose out of the emphasis that the
common law placed on the physical possession of property.
This was due in part to the inability of the early courts to
develop the conception of a right as a thing entirely separate
from any physical evidence of it,5 and also in part to the
necessity of preserving the general peace and order of the
communityt The privilege of the actor to use force has survived due to the necessity of a speedy remedy where a resort
to thc courts is slow and cumbersome and might be inadequate
101 and sec. 106.
-'Watson v. Rinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (1901).
'Hemingway v. Hemingway, 58 Conn. 443, 19 Atl. 766 (1890);
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 20 N. E. 171 (1889); State
v.Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S. W. 558 (1894); Curlee v. Scales, 209
N. C. 612, 158 S.E. 89 (1931); State v.Scott, 142 N. C. 582, 55 S.E.
69 (1906).
'Stuyvesant v.Silcox, 92 Mich. 233, 52 N. W. 465 (1892).
'Branston, The Forcible Recaption of Chattels (1912) 28 L. Q.
REv.262.
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS, see.

' II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HIST. OF ENG. LAv (1911) 41.
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because such an appeal to law could not operate opportunely or
would not be able to compel the return of the specific chattel.7
The following circumstances have been suggested as those
under which the actor is privileged to use force in the recaption
of his personal property: (a) the actor must have been in
possession, (b) the property must have been taken either
forcibly or by fraud or without claim of right, (c) the actor
must be entitled to immediate possession, (d) the recapture
must be effected promptly, (e) a request for its return must
usually first be made, and (f) the force used must not be
excessive. 8 In the earlier period the courts recognized the
privilege only when. there was a momentary interruption of
possession in view of the fact that it was not difficult to draw
an analogy to the right of protection of real property. There
the owner was regarded as defending his original possession
rather than interfering with that of another." Later the
privilege was allowed in a case where the wrong-doer had made
his escape with the chattel but the actor was in fresh pursuit."'
How fresh the pursuit must be seems to depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. The interval between one
event and another may in a particular instance be sufficient
to destroy their relation as immediate in time, while as to
other situations the same interval would not have such effect."
In the ease of Hodgeden v. Hubbard12 the plaintiff purchased a stove on credit from the defendant by fraudulent representations respecting his financial responsibility and proceeded
to take it with him. Immediately after discovering the fraud the
defendant started in pursuit of the plaintiff, overtook him
'Branston, The Forcible Recaption of Chattels (1912)

28 L. Q.

REv. 8262.

RESTATEMENT, TORTS, secs. 101-106; Uniform Act on the Fresh
Pursuit of Criminals, sec. 5; Wright v. Southern Exp. Co., 80 Fed. 85
(1897); McLean v. Colf, 179 Cal. 247, 176 Pac. 178 (1918); Baldwin
v. Hayden, 6 Conn. 453 (1827); Spelina v. Sporry, 279 Ill. App. 376
(1935); State v. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S. W. 558 (1894); Hodgeden
v. Hubbard, 18 Vt. 504, 46 Am. Dec. 167 (1846).
'Commonwealth v. Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 20 N. E. 171 (1889).
"State v. Elliott, 11 N. H. 549 (1841).
"People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572, 578 (1865), pursuit of felons three

or four hours after felony was committed and for twelve miles was

"fresh" pursuit; White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 11 So. 632 (1892), felony
committed at night, pursuit by owner upon discovery next morning,
was "fresh" pursuit.
"18 Vt. 504, 46 Am. Dec. 167 (1846).
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about two miles from the store where the transaction occurred,
and took the stove from him by force. The court ruled that
the defendant was privileged to use such force as was reasonably necessary in retaking his property if plaintiff's taking
was i raudulent and the pursuit was fresh. The court said
further that the privilege was extended to the case where the
wrong-doer resisted the defendant's attempt to retake the
chattel. A recent ease": held that a butcher was entitled to
use such force as was reasonably necessary to prevent a custamer from carrying away meat for which she had paid but
twenty cents of the twenty-three cent purchase price. The
butcher reached for the meat with one hand and slapped the
plaintiff's face with the other when she failed to pay or return
the meat. The court said that since the plaintiff had failed to
pay the additional three cents, which was the amount still due
on the meat, title had not passed and the butcher was then
privileged to use force in its recaption.
The earlier view taken by a minority of the courts assumed
the position that the dispossessed owner must not take the law
into his own hands, and could retake his property only so long
as he did not commit a breach of the peace. 14 The 'Michigan' 5
court, in an early decision, held that the owner of personal
property would have no privilege to commit a breach of the
peace in order to recapture his property from a wrong-doer,
whose po s.ession was tortious; but he would have a right to
recapture personal property whenever and wherever he might
peaeably do so, even though the original taking had been two
months before. The Kansas' court said that an owner does
not have the right to retake his property by force, or violence,
or in a riotous manner or by a breach of the peace.
A minority of the courts in this country once held to a rule
that has since vanished from our decisions, that is to say, the
owner of property, which property had been wrongfully taken
from him, was not privileged to recapture it by such force as
"Donnell v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. 229 Ala. 230, 156
So. 844 (1934). The court, however, said that the force used was
excessive.
"II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HIST. OF ENG. LAW (1911) 41.
Stuyvesant v. Wilcox, 92 Mich. 233, 52 N. W. 465 (1892).
" Rohr v. Riddell, 112 Kan. 130, 210 Pac. 644 (1922); cf. Young v.
, 183 S, W, (2d) 917 (1944).
Griesbauer,
-Mo.
-
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was reasonably necessary nor could he retake it even if he did
17
not breach the peace, but must resort to his legal remedy.
It seems from the majority of decisions that the better rule
is that the owner of property wrongfully taken should be
privileged to recapture it using such force as is reasonably
necessary to make recapture possible, so long as death or serious bodily harm does not result. When pursuit of the wrongdoer is necessary, it must be begun within a reasonable time
after the owner discovers the taking. The law should yield
that much to the frailties of human nature.
VILEY

0.
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" Kunkle v. State, 32 Ind. 22 (1868); Ryerson v. Carter, 93 N. 3.
1477, 105 At. 723 (1918), affirmed 108 At. 927 (1919).

